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A “Law & Personal Finance” View of Legal Origins
Theory
Karl S. Okamoto
In two seminal papers,1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (LLSV) spell out a
theory for the interrelationship between law and economic
development now commonly referred to as “Legal Origins Theory.”
Legal Origins Theory makes the following claims:
(1) There exist “legal families” that form separate and distinct
sets of legal systems that are made up of groups of countries, viz.,
Common Law countries (primarily Anglo-Saxon nations), Germanic
Civil Law countries (e.g., Germany and Japan), and French Civil
Law countries (e.g., France and most of continental Europe).2
(2) There is a significant correlation between a country’s “legal
origin,” which group it belongs to, and the character of certain legal
rules or procedures we find operating within that jurisdiction (e.g.,
judicial independence and contract enforcement, property right
protection, minority shareholder protection, market vs.
interventionist financial regulation, labor regulation, etc.).3
(3) These rules operate to advance certain economic ends, with
rules/procedures that tend to favor market-based, individual
contracting versus statist regulatory regimes which yield superior

 Director, Program in Business & Entrepreneurship Law and Associate Professor of
Law, Earle Mack School of Law, Drexel University. B.A. 1982, J.D. 1985, Columbia
University.
1. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FIN. 1131 (1997). A decade later, three of the four authors provided a restatement of their
theory. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et
al., Economic Consequences].
2. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 287–91 (describing the
concept of “legal families”).
3. See id. at 291–92 (describing the links between group membership and types of
legal rules and procedures).
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outcomes based on certain measures, such as market capitalization to
GDP, income per capita, and others.4
(4) Membership in a legal family is exogenously determined
(largely
by
the
process
of
colonization
and
the
assimilation/perpetuation of legal cultures by colonized
jurisdictions). The distinct character of the broad legal families is a
feature of history beginning as early as the middle ages and
extending through the revolutionary era. Despite growing global
convergence, these distinct characters persist and are significant; and
these distinct characters are a significant antecedent cause of the
types of legal rules/procedures found in a given country and,
therefore, of the resulting economic consequences.5
What makes Legal Origins Theory so interesting is its claim to be
more than simply a set of results. It claims to offer prescriptive value
for policy development.6 Beyond simply offering a descriptive
narrative of what legal choices in the past have led to the economic
consequences of today, it purports to offer ex ante a narrative on
what economic consequences will arise tomorrow from legal
conditions today. Put crudely, if we were to form a new country
today, we would see future outcomes determined by which legal
family our new country belongs. These outcomes would be
consistent with what we have seen in the past. Or so the Theory
holds.7
This claim of inevitability may overstate, to some extent, the
claims of the primary proponents of the Theory. Some have dubbed
it the “strong form.”8 However, without some assertion of predictive
value, the Theory becomes substantially less interesting. To say that
certain good economic outcomes have come out of certain legal
policies is, of course old beer. To be something more than another

4. See id. at 292–98 (reviewing the various empirical findings).
5. See id. at 306–09 (“[T]he empirical prediction of the Legal Origin Theory is that
the differences between legal origins are deep enough that we observe them expressed . . . even
after centuries of legal and regulatory evolution.”).
6. See, e.g., id. at 323–26 (describing Legal Origins Theory’s contribution to legal and
regulatory reform).
7. See id. at 326 (“[L]egal origins . . . have significant consequences for the legal and
regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.”).
8. See, e.g., John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh,
The Legal Origins Hypothesis: What are We Learning from Time-Series Evidence, 2009 BYU L.
Rev. 1435. The obvious allusion to the various forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis may
indeed be telling.
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in a long line of law and economics papers, “law & finance,” as some
have labeled LLSV’s work, needs to find a “big truth.” And like any
assertion of discovery of a big truth, no matter how modestly stated,
the assertions of Legal Origins Theory have attracted critics.9 I would
join their ranks.
There are two aspects to Legal Origins Theory that I find the
most difficult to accept. Professors Aguilera and Williams’ paper10
highlights one, Professor Fairfax’s,11 the other.
The first feature I struggle with is the notion in the Theory that
because we have found a causal channel that is significant ex post, we
therefore have a predictive tool that allows us to set policy ex ante.
LLSV revisited their theory in conjunction with the tenth anniversary
of the publication of their first papers.12 In their tour of the empire
they had built, they purport to offer some humility regarding the
predictive power of their work. Nevertheless, they conclude that
legal origins have significant consequences for economic outcomes,
and that the outcomes associated with the common law “family” are
superior.13 All of this, despite an acknowledged inability to explain
why France is a nice place to live.14

9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 59–71 (2001) (arguing that
legal origins are not determinative of the development of deep capital markets); Raghuram G.
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the
Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (arguing that financial development is better
explained by the ability of powerful incumbents to prevent openness in the marketplace to
prevent competition); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120
HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006) (post-war politics offers a better explanation than legal origins).
Perhaps the least contestable lesson from Legal Origins Theory is one about academic strategy.
If you have a choice in presenting your idea or your data results in an interesting but modest
way or as a “big idea” with an aura of inevitability and great truth to it, pick the latter. Short of
four letter words in your title, it is the most likely way to get you the download count you are
looking for and the status of “academic rock stars,” as Professors Aguilera and Williams put it.
Ruth V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, “Law and Finance”: Inaccurate, Incomplete and
Important, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413, 1420.
10. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9.
11. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1571.
12. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1.
13. Id. at 327 (“[O]ur framework suggests that the common law approach . . . performs
better than the civil law approach.”).
14. Id. at 302 (“[C]ountries like France and Belgium achieved high living standards
despite their legal origin.”).
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I cannot help but wonder if the world can really be that simple.
In a future that does not include two World Wars,15 in which men
like Brandeis and Landis16 do not live in the times that these men
lived, in a world where portfolio theory already exists and where
globalization has become rampant and capital has become truly
stateless, do the causal channels we discern for what has happened
continue to exist in order to repeat what will happen again? Is it
possible that the kind of historical events and figures that historians
labor to elucidate can be so simply washed over by the ineluctable
force of Legal Origins?17
Professors Aguilera and Williams’ notion of equifinality18
captures the point well. The potential explanations are so varied and
the interactions and path dependencies so complex, it simply defies
belief that a set of regressions on a crudely defined “small-n” sample
of “legal families” can be the basis for worldwide economic policy.19
We must allow complexity back into the narrative. Contingent
details like the strength of labor movements, the presence of foreign
investors, or the effects of war will matter.20 In a complex global
economy, where “New Multinationals”21 roam and arbitrage across
borders is the name of the game, nation-state regimes are going to
be under severe pressure, and, in my opinion, they will
homogenize.22 Cross-country studies provide a very powerful tool
for policy analysis—they always have. But like the language in the
15. See Roe, supra note 9 (arguing that the differing experiences of various nations in
the aftermath of World War II offer a better explanation for the varying approaches to
economic regulation).
16. Whatever one may say about the “great man” theory of history, it is difficult to
ignore the impact of individual events and individual persons on the development of the laws
that shape economic history. See generally THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION
(1984) (describing the contributions of Louis Brandeis and James Landis in the development
of the administrative state in the United States).
17. LLSV acknowledge that “[p]erhaps the most difficult challenge to the
hypothesis . . . has been posed by historical arguments.” La Porta et al., Economic
Consequences, supra note 1, at 315. Nevertheless, LLSV have been adept at fitting historical
counter-examples within their framework. See, e.g., id. at 315–23.
18. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1416 (“[T]here are multiple paths to any
given outcome.”).
19. Id. at 1414 (calling the groupings of legal families “rather narrow”).
20. Id. at 1415–16.
21. Id. at 1422 (describing the rise of the borderless enterprise as “the strongest
robustness test to refute the hypothesis”).
22. LLSV acknowledge this trend. See La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note
1, at 327 (“There are many arguments for convergence.”).
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front of a typical prospectus states, “past performance is no
guarantee of future results.” Of course, we can only begin with past
patterns to build our models. Many “smaller” LLSV projects—I like
the ones about judicial independence, flexibility, and contract
enforcement—have yielded a wealth of insights. But I agree with
Professors Aguilera and Williams that the models will be more useful
if they can embrace complexity.23 That is certainly one lesson I take
from our current crisis—it is the unexpected that often matters the
most.24
The second aspect of Legal Origins Theory I find hard to accept
is its malleability. For example, I find less than convincing how
LLSV’s 2008 paper argued that the rise of the U.S. regulatory state
following the Depression—a highly statutory and interventionist
regime in my opinion—was, in fact, actually an act consistent with
the common law tradition and a free market bent.25 I can easily agree
that the New Deal legislation reflected “strategies intended to
rehabilitate and support markets, not to replace them.”26 But in
doing so, what happens to the distinction between civil and common
law styles? When does the creation of an administrative
infrastructure, like the one we witnessed in the New Deal, stray from
being a market-friendly, common law solution, to being a civil law,
“state solution” that seeks to replace market forces? Similarly,
Professor Fairfax’s struggle to situate the United States government’s
recent responses to the financial crisis reveals another example of the
indeterminacy of the labels used by LLSV.
To pick one example addressed by Professor Fairfax, consider the
governmental response to the crisis at the nation’s banks. On the one
hand, Professor Fairfax notes that the level of control taken by the
Federal Reserve and the United States Treasury smacks of the kind of
“nationalization” one associates with the statist approaches of civil
law governments. As Professor Fairfax states, citing LLSV, “[t]he
quintessential hallmark of a civil law system—and thus one of its

23. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1424 (looking for “more nuanced”
institutional analyses).
24. See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007).
25. La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 308–09 (while
acknowledging that the response was highly statutory and administrative, arguing that its
essence was consistent with the common law’s pro-market character).
26. Id. at 308.
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primary tools—is control of the banking system.”27 Yet, only a few
pages later, Professor Fairfax is forced to concede that “the
characterization of America’s relationship with banks as
nationalization appears to be exaggerated.”28 She points out that the
government has gone to great lengths to structure its “bailout” of
the banking system on terms that approximate private, market
transactions.29
Generally, Professor Fairfax attempts to argue that the recent
governmental response to the financial crisis is inconsistent with the
predictions of the Legal Origins Theory. She argues that its features
favor legislative or regulatory action30 over judicial processes,31 and
that they are marked by a stark growth in administrative authority.32
My suspicion is that LLSV would have no hesitation in reaching an
opposite conclusion. Just as they felt able to explain the
administrative state that arose in response to the Depression, I doubt
they would have much difficulty in characterizing this last spate of
government intervention in the markets as utterly consistent with
their predictions. Professor Fairfax herself ends by concluding that
“what emerges is a potentially mixed story.”33 But if legal rules can
be characterized so easily as one or the other—which I think they
can—does this belie the premise of LLSV’s analysis?
In the end, however, I, like LLSV themselves,34 believe the
greatest challenge to Legal Origins Theory’s claim to big truth status
must come from a more plausible, historical retelling of their story of
cause and effect. I give you only a quick sketch of one explanation
that appeals to me. I am going to call this the “Law & Personal
Finance” School of Legal Origins Theory.
One challenge faced by every individual, and collectively by every
society, is the management of what I visualize as a lifetime of cash
flows. Over a lifetime, each of us sits at the center of a series of
flows—money in and money out. As newborns we need cash for our
sustenance, health, etc. We need cash for education, for shelter, and

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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Fairfax, supra note 11, at 1608.
Id. at 1613.
Id. at 1613–14.
Id. at 1603–05.
Id. at 1612–13.
Id. at 1606–08.
Id. at 1617.
La Porta et al., Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 315.
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so on. As we enter adulthood, we start to begin to bring cash in
through earnings and, ultimately, through investment returns. Our
challenge, however we may source or use these cash flows, is to have
net cash flow equal to or exceeding zero over a lifetime and to
maintain the required liquidity along the way that allows us to match
in and out flows as they arise.35 That’s what savings and its corollary,
borrowings, are for.
Now, recent events have highlighted two problems. First, many
people in our society will not succeed in achieving a positive net
lifetime cash flow without substantially changing their lifestyles or
receiving outside help, and, second, many people today cannot solve
the liquidity puzzle.36 While these problems have been looming in
the United States for some time, the crash in various asset markets
has brought these issues to the point of crisis.
So, what does this have to do with Legal Origins Theory? Well, I
see an answer in the concept of “equity culture.” Equity culture is a
phrase we once saw all the time in the early 1990s when American
investment firms began assessing their global expansion priorities. A
country like the United Kingdom, and more recently India,37 was
seen as promising investment territory because of its strong “equity
cultures.” Nordic countries were also seen as promising (although
less so). Countries like Germany,38 and especially France,39 were
distinctly less attractive despite the size of their economies because of
their “lack” of an “equity culture.” You will no doubt notice the
35. My favorite discussion of this challenge is found in JOE DOMINGUEZ & VICKI
ROBIN, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE (1992).
36. See, e.g., S. Mitra Kalita, The ‘Democratization’ of Credit is Over—Now It’s Payback
Time, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125511860883676713.html (describing the over-leveraging by consumers and the impact
of tightening credit).
37. See, e.g., Nandini Lakshman, Private Equity Invades India, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 8,
2007, at 40 (reporting on the influx of private equity investment into India).
38. See, e.g., John Eisenhammer, View from Frankfurt: Learning How to Be Held to
Account, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 15, 1994, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
business/view-from-frankfurt-learning-how-to-be-held-to-account-john-eisenhammer-atchesgerman-companies-try-to-cope-with-sharp-changes-to-share-trading-laws-1376584.html
(“The explanation lies in the fact that Germany is a different economy, one shaped by the
relative lack of a dynamic investor culture. . . . Only recently, Rolf Breuer, chairman of the
German Stock Exchange and a board member of Deutsche Bank, bemoaned the lack of an
equity culture.”); Phillip Moore, Franz Takes to Equities, At Last, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1994, at
83 (describing the rise of an equity culture in Germany).
39. See, e.g., Anne Swardson, Cultivating a Taste for French Stocks, WASH. POST, Nov.
17, 1999, at E1 (describing the lack of an equity culture in France).
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confluence between Legal Origins Theory’s map of “legal families”
and this “equity culture” geography. They are the same.
Broadly put, “equity culture” measures the degree to which the
investing public participates directly in risk capital markets.40 In other
words, to return to my story of lifetime cash flows, high equity
cultures are markets where individuals attempt to solve their cash
flow challenge by converting excess labor returns into risk capital
returns by investing in equities.41 Common law countries, like the
United States and Great Britain, have high equity cultures; civil law
countries, like France, do not. So, do Legal Origins drive equity
cultures? LLSV certainly suggest that they drive the rules that one
would expect where equity culture flourishes.
But I am not convinced of the causal connection between Legal
Origin and equity culture. In a world where cash flows travel with
increasing ease across borders, why would we expect rules in one
jurisdiction to affect demand (as opposed, perhaps, to supply) for
equity investments? In other words, legal rules have more to say
about what investment vehicles may be offered in a given
jurisdiction, not necessarily about which investments savers in that
jurisdiction choose to make.42 Since savers can access investment
opportunities on a global basis, the rules of the jurisdiction in which
they happen to live do not affect their choice, but rather, simply
what kind of local options are available.43 Equity culture, on the
other hand, is about demand; it is about the choice individuals make
in solving the cash flow problem.
40. See Michael Haliassos & Christis Hassapis, Equity Culture and Household Behavior,
54 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 719 (2002) (describing the spread of equity culture in Western
Europe).
41. Interestingly, recent studies suggest individuals are not successful in using the equity
markets for building wealth. See, e.g., Yannis Bilias, Dimitirs Georgarakos & Michael Haliassos,
Equity Culture and the Distribution of Wealth (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No.
2005/20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=731805.
42. In fact, much of the debate about regulation of financial markets before the recent
crisis centered on the impact of regulation on the competitiveness of U.S. equity markets and
on the global scene. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for
Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008) (describing the proliferation of equity
markets around the globe as creating a new market for regulation).
43. Another study makes a similar point in finding that parties to agreements that elect
international arbitration as their mode of dispute resolution do not shun French law or favor
common law to the degree that LLSV would suggest. Stefan Voigt, Are International
Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory (working paper,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982202. In other words, Legal Origins Theory
does not explain the parties’ demand for law of different legal families.
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This leads me to posit a different possibility. How does law affect
demand rather than supply? I will propose two ways by which this
may occur. One that I believe is only marginally important and the
other counter-intuitive. Marginally important are taxes.44 I say
marginally because I suspect whatever choices any one jurisdiction
makes to favor or disfavor equity through taxation can be arbitraged
away by sophisticated investors.
The other, potentially more important, factor is a country’s
approach to social welfare. This coincides with Mark Roe’s45 and
others’ political explanations, but is different in its locus of
operation. This is not a battle between labor and elites. This is a
battle between state and market-based finance.
In countries where education, healthcare, and retirement—the
terrible trio of personal finance—are guaranteed by the state, in
other words, where the state takes on the management of lifetime
cash flow through taxation and subsidy, individuals can afford to
shun the risk associated with equities.46 As a friend once put it, “it’s
like work—why do it if you don’t have to?” Instead, they favor cash,
bonds, and hard assets. In countries where the safety net of statebased social welfare programs are weak, the need to overcome
inflation and generate positive real returns to fund real future cash
needs, like education, healthcare, and retirement, leads those who do
save (and that’s another problem) to invest in equities.47

44. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Ayers, C. Bryan Cloyd & John R. Robinson, “Read
My Lips . . .”: Does the Tax Rhetoric of Presidential Candidates Affect Security Prices, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 125 (2005) (finding that securities prices are impacted by changing market
expectations regarding tax rates); Sandra Renfro Callaghan & Christopher B. Barry, TaxInduced Trading of Equity Securities: Evidence from the ADR Market, 58 J. FIN. 1583 (2003)
(finding that taxes on dividend income affect trading patterns around ex-dividend dates);
Robert E. Hall & Dale W. Jorgenson, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 391 (1967) (finding that tax policy impacts the level and timing of firm-level
investments).
45. Roe, supra note 9.
46. You might argue that having a social safety net should allow individuals to take
greater risk in their portfolios. This assumes, however, that individuals pursue wealth
maximization as their investment goal rather than need satisfaction.
47. One recent paper comes to a similar conclusion, finding that the choice of statebased versus private pension funding is explained by antecedent inflationary shocks that have
the effect of depleting the savings of the middle class. These shocks lead to a political
preference for redistributive, publicly funded solutions. See Enrico Perotti & Armin
Schwienbacher, The Political Origin of Pension Funding (working paper, Mar. 31, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957752.
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So, what does this mean for our assessment of Legal Origins
Theory? Well, like Professor Fairfax’s retelling of the current
regulatory response, this parallel narrative can be fit within the
traditional Legal Origins story.
The general notion, that common law families tend to offer
market-based solutions, is consistent with the description of the
conditions likely to cause demand for equity. Also, the tendency to
interventionist solutions does jibe with the high social welfare culture
that leads to low equity demand. This parallel narrative also fits
within the prescriptive narrative of LLSV by linking equity culture
with economic growth. Equity culture certainly leads to larger and
more dispersed capital markets, by definition. The availability of risk
capital should also decrease the cost of capital, thus increasing
investment and economic growth. The relative strength of venture
capital in the Anglo-American world and its consequences for
economic activity might be cited also (although I am not sure this
fairly takes account of other forms of “venture” finance in, say, the
Mittlestand in Germany or the “entrepreneur” communities in
Italy).48 Overall, you can see how we might fit this alternative
narrative of “equity cultures” into the Theory’s prediction of
superior economic outcomes for common law countries.
The explanatory efficacy of “equity culture” with regard to
economic growth would fit nicely into the Theory’s predictive
power, except for the one most glaring lesson I see in our current
travails—leaving individuals and markets to solve the problem of
lifetime cash flow does not look like it is going to work. They are not
up to it. Enter here all the behavioral economists and the like.49 But
whatever the explanation—personally I’m happy with “it’s simply
very hard”—people systematically fail. And so the question then
becomes how to fix this. I would suggest that much of the mess we
are in today stems from the market’s attempt to develop structures
that are intended (genuinely or cynically) to address the problem of
lifetime cash flows. It is what drives demand for so-called absolute
return strategies. It lies at the center of securitization. It is what

48. Professors Aguilera and Williams also note the ongoing debate over the performance
of family-owned businesses. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1419 (“[T]he jury is still out
. . . on whether family-owned firms perform worse . . . .”).
49. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government
Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2000) (arguing that government may be complicit in
creating an irrational faith in the equities as a savings device).
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hedge funds, variable annuities, esoteric mortgages, etc. offer. It is a
problem that can, in the end, only be solved by somebody investing
in risk capital. The question is who? Individuals? The government?
Or maybe something in between? LLSV seems to say that the only
good answer is the common law’s preference for “individuals and
markets.” Recent history, on the other hand, seems to suggest that
the answer may not be so simple. We should hesitate whenever the
simplification that often comes with a purported “big truth” asks us
to ignore the messiness we so often see around us.
For all of its explanatory power ex post, I, like Professor Fairfax
and Professors Aguilar and Williams, am not sure Legal Origins
Theory has much to contribute to finding the right answers going
forward for how we should organize our economic institutions. The
recent crisis has certainly raised some doubt as to the ineluctable
superiority of unregulated markets. Perhaps more fundamentally, it
has caused some of us to re-examine the assumptions that underlie
our definitions of success. Our faith in the linkage between financial
markets and well-being has been shaken. To return to my story of
life-time cash flow, we will ask again whether a society should
measure success by how wealthy it becomes or perhaps rather by
how many of its members do in fact achieve a positive lifetime cash
flow. As Professors Aguilera and Williams point out, different
measures of success—like measuring more than growth in financial
markets—often yield outcomes quite contrary to the LLSV analysis.50
While it is interesting to consider what role legal origins played in
how we became what we are, it is much more important to consider
now whether we continue to want to remain the same. I do not see
how Legal Origins Theory helps in that decision.

50. Aguilera & Williams, supra note 9, at 1433 (“[T]he debates over the superiority of
different capitalist systems of economic organization should not be considered over.”).
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